小さな野党が混在する理由
昨年は昭和100年にあたったため、「昭和100年史を遡る会」という企画をしました。
現代史を学ぶ事で、日本をより深く知ろうという思いでしたが、戦後の政治史の根本には、改憲をさせないというGHQの意思があったことに気づきました。
改憲できない限り、日本には独立国家の芽がない。
1955年、保守合同によって誕生した自由民主党は、単なる政党ではなく「政権交代が起きにくい制度の中核」として機能してきました。
ポイントは3つあります。
1)憲法改正ラインを超えない“管理された野党”
衆参両院で改憲に必要な3分の2を、与野党が結束して超えることはほぼ不可能な議席配分
2)野党は存在するが、「勝てない程度に強い」
大同小異の野党乱立構造
政策差が小さい政党が分裂・再編を繰り返す
結果として票は集まらず、批判だけが拡散する
3)選挙制度の効果
中選挙区制 → 小選挙区比例代表並立制への移行も含め
「最大勢力が常に有利」になる設計
野党は“政権を取る”より“存在する”ことが合理的になる
野党が「勝たない方が楽」な理由
これは陰謀論ではなく、制度設計とインセンティブの問題です。
与党
官僚機構・業界団体・予算編成との連動
野党
責任を負わず、理想論を語れる
失政のコストを背負わない
それでも議席と政党交付金は得られる
つまり
「政権交代を本気で目指さない野党」が最も安定する
という逆説的均衡が成立してしまった。
憲法改正が起きない本当の理由
国民の賛否以前に、改憲勢力が3分の2を超えないように分散されている
野党が結束するインセンティブがない
与党も「改憲を本気で通す覚悟」を持たなくて済む
結果として、憲法は“触れない象徴”として固定化される。
票が割れるのは失敗ではなく、割れるように設計されているのです。
新党が生まれやすい
消えやすい
合流しにくい
共通綱領を作れない
この構造がある限り、どれだけ「野党が増えても」、何度も選挙をしても結果は変わらないのです。
Screenshot
Why So Many Small Opposition Parties Coexist
Last year marked the 100th anniversary of the Shōwa era, so I organized a project titled “Looking Back on 100 Years of Shōwa History.” The aim was to gain a deeper understanding of Japan by studying modern history. In doing so, I came to realize that at the core of Japan’s postwar political history lay the will of the GHQ to prevent constitutional revision. As long as the Constitution cannot be amended, Japan has no real foundation as a fully independent state.
The Liberal Democratic Party, born in 1955 through the merger of conservative forces, has functioned not merely as a political party, but as the core of a system in which a change of government is structurally difficult to occur.
There are three key points.
1) “Managed opposition” that never crosses the constitutional revision threshold
The distribution of seats in both the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors makes it virtually impossible for ruling and opposition parties combined to exceed the two-thirds majority required for constitutional amendment.
2) Opposition parties exist, but are “strong enough not to win”
A fragmented structure in which many opposition parties with only minor differences coexist
Parties with similar policy positions repeatedly split and reorganize
As a result, votes do not consolidate, while criticism alone spreads
3) The effects of the electoral system
Including the shift from multi-member districts to the current parallel system of single-member districts and proportional representation
The system is designed so that “the largest force is always advantaged”
For opposition parties, it becomes more rational to “exist” than to “take power”
Why it is easier for opposition parties not to win
This is not a conspiracy theory, but a matter of institutional design and incentives.
For the ruling party:
– Integration with the bureaucracy, industry groups, and the budgetary process
For the opposition:
– The ability to speak in ideals without bearing responsibility
– No need to shoulder the costs of policy failure
– Yet still able to secure seats and public party subsidies
In other words, a paradoxical equilibrium has emerged in which
“opposition parties that do not seriously aim for a change of government”
are the most stable.
The real reason constitutional revision never happens
Even before public opinion comes into play, pro-revision forces are dispersed so that they never exceed the two-thirds threshold.
Opposition parties have no incentive to unite.
The ruling party does not need to muster the resolve to push constitutional revision through in earnest.
As a result, the Constitution becomes fixed as an untouchable symbol.
Vote splitting is not a failure—it is designed to happen.
New parties are easy to form.
They disappear easily.
They rarely merge.
They cannot create a shared platform.
As long as this structure remains, no matter how many opposition parties emerge, and no matter how many elections are held, the outcome will not change.
